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STEFAN SCHUBERT
Objectivism, Narrative Agency, and the Politics of Choice 
in the Video Game BioShock
Abstract: In this article, I investigate the video game BioShock for
its political and cultural work and argue that it offers a popular plat-
form to  discuss  the  politically  charged  question  of  choice,  both
inside and outside the realm of video games. In a first section, I in-
troduce the game’s basic plot and setting, propose a way to study
how video games operate narratively, and briefly discuss the ‘politi-
cal’ dimension  of  games  in  general.  Afterwards,  I  look  at  how
BioShock is influenced by Ayn Rand’s philosophy of objectivism, a
philosophy that  emphasizes  the  importance  of  individual  choice
and  self-interest,  and  I  trace  this  influence  specifically  in  the
game’s main antagonist, Andrew Ryan, and its setting, the under-
water city of Rapture. With these elements as a basis, I analyze how
BioShock engages with the politics of choice, focusing on a major
twist scene in the game to demonstrate how  BioShock deals with
the question of choice on a metatextual level. Reading this scene in
the context of the game’s overall narrative,  specifically of moral
choices in the game that lead to different endings, I argue that the
game metatextually connects the political question of choice inher-
ent in objectivism to the narrative and the playing of the game,
pointing to the ambivalences inherent in questions of choice, agen-
cy, and free will.
Introduction
Published in 2007 by 2K Games and developed by Irrational Games, the
video  game  BioShock has  been  an  immense  critical  and  commercial
success, having been lauded by scholars and reviewers alike as “the master-
piece of recent gaming” (Tavinor 91) and as a title that can “hold its head
high among the best games ever made” (Schiesel). The game’s “immense
popularity”  (Aldred  and  Greenspan  483)—having  sold  more  than  four
million copies (Remo)—is often attributed to two core factors: its engaging
story (combined with its general interest in and exploration of how narra-
tives in video games work) as well as the carefully crafted world that it
presents and lets players explore, a world that is influenced by Ayn Rand’s
political philosophy of objectivism. Accordingly,  BioShock has been dis-
cussed as exhibiting a “complex,  sophisticated and intertextual  narrative
world”  (Kraus  90)  and  as  demonstrating  a  “complex  engagement  with
broad  political  ideas”  and  problematizing  “ideologies  of  individualism”
(Tulloch 34). Likewise, scholars regard it as a game that “raises [...] large
questions of free will and choice” (Wysocki and Schandler 205) and that
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“simultaneously  celebrates  and  interrogates  utopian  notions  of
technological progress and free will” (Aldred and Greenspan 479). Overall,
it  has thus been praised for  combining ‘serious’ political  ideas with the
‘popular’ medium of the video game, leading a reviewer of the  Chicago
Sun-Times to state: “I never once thought anyone would be able to create an
engaging and entertaining video game around the fiction and philosophy of
Ayn Rand, but that is essentially what 2K Games has done . . . the rare,
mature video game that succeeds in making you think while you play” (qtd.
in Kraus 91).
In this article, I will investigate this highly popular video game for its
‘political’ dimension, that is, for the political and cultural work it does and
for the (meta)textual quality of its politicality. BioShock depicts a world in-
fluenced by Ayn Rand’s philosophy,  which has recently gone through a
renaissance in American discourse and which foregrounds the importance
of  individualism,  individual  choice,  and the  pursuit  of  what  Rand  calls
‘rational self-interest.’ The game thus deals with both Rand’s actual ideas
and the related, more general questions of choice, free will, and agency. At
the same time, through its narrative and the mechanics of its medium (the
gameplay), it connects both the concrete issues concerning Rand’s objec-
tivism and the related more abstract questions to a metatextual discussion
of the nature of choice and narrative in video games: The game performs its
‘political’ ideas  (revolving  around objectivism and  thus  the  question  of
choice) on a metatextual level as well (in the agency and the choices that
players do and do not have).
Before delving into a narrative analysis of BioShock specifically, I will
first  introduce  the  game’s  basic  plot  and  setting  while  also  briefly  dis-
cussing how video games’ narrative elements can generally be investigated
and to what extent games can be considered ‘political.’ Subsequently, in
order to discuss how the game references and criticizes Rand’s philosophy
of objectivism, I will look at the influence of her philosophical and political
ideology  on  the  character  of  Andrew  Ryan  and  on  the  depiction  of
BioShock’s city of Rapture. Finally, I will uncover how the game engages
with ‘political’ questions even beyond objectivism and in reference to video
games  and  textuality  in  general  by  analyzing  BioShock’s  narrative  and
gameplay in closer detail, specifically discussing the game’s ‘twist’ scene
and the choice players have in dealing with the so-called Little Sisters. In
doing so, I will argue that BioShock uses Ayn Rand’s political philosophy in
order to offer a popular platform for elaborate discussions of choice, free
will, and agency, of how much choice or agency one can have in video
games—and the self-consciously metatextual quality of this discussion is
what moves this question beyond video games as well. While evading a
clear answer to the questions it so productively poses, the game points to
the ambivalences inherent in agency and choice, emphasizing that ‘abso-
lute’ free will or agency are illusory.
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BioShock, Narrativity, and ‘Politics’ in Video Games
BioShock is set in a science fiction/biopunk world in which players assume
the role of the game’s protagonist Jack, the only survivor of a plane crash
over the ocean, and follow his perspective in exploring an enormous under-
water  city  called  Rapture.  The  game  is  a  first-person  shooter,  that  is,
players play in first-person mode, as Jack, seeing what he sees, being con-
stricted to what he is able to experience. As a shooter game, combating
many of Rapture’s mostly deranged inhabitants (called ‘splicers’) makes up
the majority of BioShock’s gameplay, yet the exploration of the world and
progressing through the game’s various levels takes on an almost equally
prominent role. In the game’s story, players learn that Rapture was built by
the egomaniac businessman Andrew Ryan in the 1950s to escape the appar-
ently  looming  threats  of  socialism and  the  US government’s  variant  of
capitalism with its state-sponsored social programs. Jack enters Rapture in
the year 1960 and is assisted by a man called Atlas helping him navigate
through the city and fight against Ryan, who suspects Jack to be a spy and
sends many of his forces to combat the player. Along the way, Jack finds
out more and more about the world of Rapture and how it has been ravaged
by the misuse of genetically modifying serums called ‘plasmids’ as well as
by a civil war that pitted Ryan against a man called Frank Fontaine, the
leader of the opposition to Ryan’s regime, who was killed by Ryan a few
years prior to Jack entering Rapture. During the course of the story, players
learn what has happened to Rapture and its inhabitants and uncover the
truth about  many of  the main characters,  including the identity  of  their
player avatar, Jack.
In order to understand how  BioShock  narratively operates as  a video
game and how it presents its world of Rapture, I will make use of the narra-
tological concept of the storyworld.1 David Herman refers to storyworlds as
the “mental models of who did what to and with whom, when, where, why,
and in what fashion in the world to which interpreters relocate [...] as they
work  to  comprehend  a  narrative”  (9).  In  this  sense,  the  concept  of  the
1 Discussing video games in terms of narratives and narrativity in general is a long-
standing point of contention in the field of game studies. The question whether
video games can be understood as narratives—or as having narrative elements—at
all has been heatedly discussed as part of the so-called ludology vs. narratology
debate. For the purpose of this article, I do not wish to engage in this debate but
will instead look specifically at the narrative elements that  BioShock undoubtedly
has,  without  wanting  to  address  the  formalist  question  of  what  games  like
BioShock ‘are,’ which is what much of the debate is implicitly about. At the same
time, however, I will also pay attention to the unique elements of the medium of the
video game that complicate more traditional understandings of narrative. For de-
tailed explorations of the early phases of game studies that also include details of
the ludology vs. narratology debate, cf., e.g., Egenfeldt-Nielsen, Smith, and Tosca
189-204; Wolf and Perron 2-13; or Mäyrä 5-11.
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storyworld focuses on the role of readers of a text in “trying to make sense
of a narrative” as they “attempt to reconstruct not just what happened [...]
but also the surrounding context or environment embedding existents, their
attributes,  and  the  actions  and  events  in  which  they  are  more  or  less
centrally  involved”  (13-14).  Thus,  this  concept  draws  attention  to  the
process of creating an understanding of how the story, the characters, and
the setting in a text come together. While storyworlds have ‘traditionally’
been  used  to  analyze  novels,  the  concept  can  also  be  employed  to
investigate how video games narrate:2 As players play through a game, the
world that is presented to them instigates a mental process of (re)creating
what  is  being (aurally  and visually)  witnessed as  the storyworld  of  the
game.
Focusing on the storyworld of a game—instead of focusing on the narra-
tive—is  especially  productive  because  it  complements  two of  the  most
important narrative characteristics of video games. For one, video games
are an interactive medium, that is, they depend on the player’s (physical)
input in order to ‘work’ as  a game.3 Although different  for  every video
game, generally, this inherent aspect of the medium leads to nonlinearity in
a game’s narrative—a player might decide to venture to a specific part of a
game’s world first  and then to another,  but  another player (or  the same
player in another playthrough) might do it the other way round, experienc-
ing the narrative in a different  order.  In some games,  such decisions or
choices will then also lead to different narrative outcomes, for instance to
multiple different endings to one game. In this sense, video games often do
not have one ‘fixed,’ linear narrative to which one could refer. Focusing not
so  much (just)  on  this  narrative  but  on  the storyworld and thus  on the
process of  how players  construct  such a narrative (as  part  of  the story-
world)  allows  for  more  flexibility  in  understanding  and  analyzing  how
games operate narratively. Secondly, video games generally place a large
emphasis on space in their storytelling (cf., e.g., Jenkins), and the active ex-
ploration (not just the witnessing) of space takes up a considerable part of
many games. Likewise, how players of a game learn about what has hap-
pened in a game’s fictional universe is also commonly transmitted through
the careful exploration of parts of the world, and often, such exploration is
an optional element of the game, which ties this aspect back to games’ non-
linearity. Ultimately, using the concept of the storyworld facilitates a focus
2 Cf. Ryan and Thon for examples of investigations of storyworlds in different kinds
of media as well as in transmedia environments.
3 This notion of interactivity is also not without controversy in game studies (cf.,
e.g., Aarseth 48-49), as is the related concept of nonlinearity, and different termi-
nologies and models for understanding what exactly it is that makes (video) games
different  from other  media  have  been  proposed.  Since  this  is  not  the  place  to
discuss these in detail, I will instead only focus on how BioShock uses its interac-
tive potential as a video game, which I will accordingly look at in the following
chapters.
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not on how players recreate a game’s narrative but on how they recreate a
game’s fictional world (as the storyworld) in which that narrative—among
others elements such as characters and locations—unfolds, allowing to take
space into consideration as an aspect of storytelling.
In general, by looking at the narrative and gameplay of BioShock, I also
want to emphasize the ‘political’ potential  and the cultural  and political
work of video games in general.4 As a relatively new medium, video games
are sometimes dismissed as childish, trivial,  not ‘serious,’ or a waste of
time (cf. Purchese) and are seen by some as “frivolous, pointless, or un-
sophisticated things,” as Tavinor summarizes (92). While such normative
assessments  of  video  games  seem quite  unproductive  academically,  in-
stances  of  this  argument  also  come  up  in  scholarly  discussions,  partly
perhaps because the allegedly nonserious ‘playfulness’ of postmodernism is
sometimes confused with the ‘playing’ inherent in video games, with the
activity of ‘play’ in general (cf. Huizinga).5 Such traces of dismissing video
games also appear in discussions of  BioShock, visible for instance in the
aforementioned Chicago Sun-Times review talking about “the rare, mature
video game” (qtd. in Kraus 91; emphasis mine). Similarly, some scholars
allege that “BioShock appears an unlikely philosophical text” because it “at
first  seems  indistinguishable  from  the  majority  of  other  first-person
shooters” (Packer 210) and that, “[a]t first glance,  BioShock might appear
to be an unlikely game for deep examination” as it is “primarily a first-
person shooter with a strong undercurrent of survival-horror” (Wysocki and
Schandler  200). They  do  not  conclusively  explain,  however,  why  one
would  deem such  a  game  (or  any  game in  general)  “unlikely  for  deep
examination”  in  the  first  place.  While  these  scholarly  allegations  of
nonseriousness are thus almost always only implicit, the general suspicion
remains that video games are not a medium necessarily to be taken serious. 
By taking a look at the ‘politics’ of BioShock, I want to stress that even
if video games always have to be played in order to work as games, this
does not mean that playing them is in itself only a ‘playful’—in the sense
of nonserious—activity. To the contrary, video games can be seen as a very
political  medium,  partly  of  course  because  of  its  immense  commercial
4 For Paul Lauter, looking at the cultural work of a text entails asking how it “helps
construct  the  frameworks,  fashion  the  metaphors,  create  the  very  language  by
which people comprehend their experiences and think about their world” (11; cf.
also Tompkins). Similarly, I understand looking at the political work that a text
does as investigating how it enables political discussion, how it performs politics,
and how it can also be considered ‘political’ on a narrative or textual level—aspects
of a text that one could also understand as part of its cultural work.
5 In this sense, many of the arguments brought up specifically against video games
are very much in line with similar ‘allegations’ against popular culture in general.
Specifically, some of these arguments, which are presumably about video games’
textuality, are, in fact, ‘standard’ arguments against popular culture only utilizing
the metaphor of ‘play.’
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popularity,6 which firmly ties it to the consumer logics of production and
reception. More importantly, I understand them as ‘political’ in a more ab-
stract  sense:  The  interactive,  nonlinear  nature  of  many  video  games
demands an ‘active’ engagement with the medium by its players; it fosters
an active audience similar to other contemporary texts that have readers
“participat[e] in a text’s negotiation of meaning” (Herrmann, Kanzler, and
Usbeck 8),  and even inherently so due to  the (not  just  mental  but  also
‘physical’) interactivity of the medium. In this vein, video games can also
be seen as part of new forms of textuality that are being negotiated in con-
temporary American culture.  ‘Playing,’ in  this  sense,  can certainly be a
serious and a political activity, as the case of BioShock will demonstrate.
Rand’s Objectivism and Ryan’s Rapture
To understand how  BioShock engages  with  Ayn Rand’s  ideas  of  objec-
tivism, I will first briefly discuss some of the most important elements of
her philosophy—or at least those elements that are often associated with
objectivism and that have made it popular. Rand mainly expressed her phi-
losophy in her novels The Fountainhead (1943) and Atlas Shrugged (1957).
Some of the important tenets of objectivism are a belief in rational self-in-
terest, that is, in the pursuit of one’s own happiness, and in the importance
of individualism and individual choice. Rand thus sharply criticizes social-
ism, in which, in her view, the happiness of a collective—of everybody—is
foregrounded,  and  also  types  of  capitalism that  include  state-sponsored
social programs and a redistribution of wealth, both of which are forms of
‘collectivism’ for Rand (Packer 213). Instead, the only form of an economy
and indeed a government style that suits objectivism is completely unregu-
lated  laissez-faire  capitalism  in  which  wealthy  members  of  society  are
considered ‘productive’ and cannot be obligated to compensate for the less
wealthy and supposedly ‘unproductive’ and ‘undeserving’ ones. This politi-
cal dimension of the more complex overall ideas of objectivism7 is how
Ayn Rand is most often evoked in public debates, and it is also the way
BioShock’s world has been influenced by it—in a way, one could see this as
a popular understanding of objectivism. Rand’s ideas, in whatever ways,
6 As Arthur Asa Berger notes, “[m]ost people are surprised to find out that the video
game industry is larger than the film industry” (24).
7 Thijs  van  den Berg,  for  instance,  summarizes  other  parts  of  the  philosophy as
claiming  that  “reality  exists  independently from the  subject,  that  this  reality  is
knowable to the subject through a unique perspective of observation and reason
that help to determine the subject’s chances of survival. This, in turn, claims Rand,
allows us to conclude that the individual, within a social context, has an unalien-
able right to protect the products of his or her reason so as to maximize chances of
survival” (par. 7). The idea of such an ‘objectively’ knowable reality is also where
the term ‘objectivism’ comes from.
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are relevant to this day and have recently seen a resurgence in American
discourse.8 This influence of objectivism is also visible in the fact that a
game like BioShock takes it up as a subject and engages with its underlying
ideas.
On the surface, objectivist ideas in BioShock are most visible in two nar-
rative elements, the figure of Andrew Ryan and the city of Rapture that he
built and that players explore in the game. Players learn about Ryan’s core
beliefs and his motivation for constructing Rapture through numerous ways
in the game, most prominently via quotes by him displayed throughout the
world, through so-called audio diaries with messages recorded by him that
players can obtain, and, more directly, as Ryan later communicates with the
player character with the help of a shortwave radio. In the beginning of the
game, as players navigate Jack through the water and towards a lighthouse
after the plane crash, a banner displays the words “No gods or kings. Only
Man,” a first indication of the importance of individuals and the rejection
of  religion  and  state  rule  (in  the  form of  monarchy).  Subsequently,  as
players  board  a  bathysphere  to  reach  the  underwater  city,  they  hear  a
recorded voice-over by Ryan further building on these ideas: 
I am Andrew Ryan, and I’m here to ask you a question. Is a man not entitled to
the sweat of his brow? “No,” says the man in Washington, “it belongs to the
poor.” “No,” says the man in the Vatican, “it belongs to God.” “No,” says the
man in Moscow, “it belongs to everyone.” I rejected those answers. Instead, I
chose something different. I chose the impossible. I chose . . . Rapture. A city
where  the artist  would not  fear  the  censor,  where the scientist  would  not  be
bound by petty morality, where the great would not be constrained by the small.
Ryan’s speech—the first words players hear from him in the game—is also
the  first  of  many  indications  that  he  believes  in  objectivist  ideas,  with
Washington, the Vatican, and Moscow metonymically standing for state-
sponsored capitalism in the United States, religion, and communism in the
Soviet Union, respectively, all of which Ryan rejects. His phrasing that “the
great would not be constrained by the small” closely mirrors Ayn Rand’s
idea of rational self-interest and the privileging of the most ‘productive’
members of society. The rejection of ‘collectivism’ inherent in Ryan’s dis-
missal of the United States and the Soviet Union and, instead, the focus on
individual  entitlement  and  self-determination  are  the  cornerstones  of
Ryan’s ideology, which also closely mirrors the popular understanding of
Rand’s political ideas. Ryan’s ideas are illuminated in similar ways in other
instances of the game, and along with them, BioShock also features a few
more direct allusions to Rand’s works. For example, as scholars like Joseph
8 For instance, Joseph Packer argues that the “economic recession of 2008 and sub-
sequent  government  bailouts  have  brought  a  renewed  popular  interest  in  Ayn
Rand’s  philosophy  of  Objectivism”  (209);  likewise,  van  den  Berg  notes  that
“[m]ore recently, Rand gained further notoriety through the Tea Party movement”
(par. 15).
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Packer have noted, the name Andrew Ryan is “almost an anagram of Ayn
Rand”  (213);  the  character  of  Atlas  refers  to  the  title  of  Rand’s  Atlas
Shrugged and,  at  the  same  time,  posters  in  the  game  asking  “Who  is
Atlas?” mirror the famous question “Who is John Galt?” in Rand’s novel
(215); and “[l]ater in the game the player learns that like Rand, Ryan was
born in the Soviet Union and fled to the United States” (214).
BioShock engages with the ideas of objectivism not just via the character
of Andrew Ryan but even more pervasively through the city of Rapture and
by how players go about exploring that city (in which the whole game is
set).  In  the  game’s  diegesis,  Ryan  envisioned  Rapture  as  an  objectivist
utopia, and this influence can be traced by players as they progress through
the game. Crucially, compared to the characterization of Ryan, the game is
subtler in how it depicts Rapture as objectivist, since players learn about
the different locations and inhabitants as well as the history of Rapture only
through  careful  exploration  and  attention  to  detail;  the  game  does  not
‘force’ these elements onto the player (as would be the case, for instance, if
the game explained the city’s history in unskippable cutscenes). Players fa-
miliarize themselves with Rapture and its history by paying close attention
to  the  environments,  for  instance  to  banners  displaying  objectivism-
inspired messages (such as “Altruism is the root of all wickedness”); by
overhearing  conversations  between  other  characters;  and  especially  by
listening  to  the  audio  diaries  scattered  around  the  city.  Many  of  these
elements are optional; for example, some of the audio diaries are quite well
hidden within the different levels of the game and can only be obtained if
players are willing to stray from the main path of the game from time to
time. In this sense, how players narratively explore Rapture can vary in
different playthroughs, and accordingly, two players of the game (or one
player in multiple playthroughs) might construct a different storyworld of
the game, filled with variable levels of information regarding the setting,
the characters, and some of the events that have happened before players
arrived in Rapture.
If players do engage with the history of Rapture, they learn that Rapture
was built as a city in which every inhabitant should follow his or her own
interest,  uninhibited  by  others,  pursuing  their  own  happiness  without
having  to  take  social  responsibility  for  others—but  crucially,  the  game
depicts Rapture after its ‘fall,’ that is, after Ryan’s objectivist experiment
has apparently failed. What players witness of his utopian objectivist dream
is instead decidedly dystopian.9 The city has been ravaged and plundered
after a civil war, and many of its localities have decayed, a decay that is
pervasively  symbolized by  masses  of  water  in  Rapture:  As  Evan Watts
9 Cf.  Aldred  and  Greenspan  or  Schmeink  for  detailed  studies  of  BioShock as  a
dystopia. Schmeink also reads  BioShock as part of the alternate history genre; cf.
Lizardi for another study that also analyzes the games in the BioShock series as al-
ternate histories. 
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points  out,  “scorched  debris,  bullet-riddled  corpses,  and  cracks  gushing
ocean water into the city [...] serve as aesthetic reminders of the failure not
just of the structural integrity of Rapture, but of the ideology on which it
was formed” (254), and Thijs van den Berg likewise notes the “pervasive
presence of seawater that is seeping into Rapture’s submerged buildings”
and that  “is  persistently  reminding the player  of  the fact  that  Rapture’s
structure is failing” (par. 11). Rapture’s laissez-faire capitalism eventually
led to ruthless business practices and to the overpricing of basic needs like
food and healthcare, quickly turning life problematic for the city’s less for-
tunate population. Likewise, many essential jobs were unfilled because the
entitled citizens of Rapture deemed them beneath them—as the character
Frank Fontaine puts it in an audio diary players can find in his apartment:
“[S]omebody’s gotta scrub the toilets.” The city of Rapture thus appears as
an embodiment of objectivism taken to its extreme, an exaggerated depic-
tion of  “the irony of  an objectivist  utopia  running amok” (Tavinor  92).
Consequently,  this  aspect  of  the game can most  evidently  be read as  a
“thorough critique of Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism” (Packer 210).10
The  criticism  of  an  (over)reliance  on  self-interest  and  individualism,
perhaps especially in a time of “renewed popular interest in Ayn Rand’s
philosophy” (Packer 209), is one way in which the game can clearly be un-
derstood as doing political work, as it can be interpreted as “a rebuke and
rejection of Randian thought in a time where it is resurgent amongst Ameri-
can right wing, neo-liberalist and neo-conservative politicians, economists
and media pundits” (Tulloch 30). Yet while these engagements with objec-
tivism are already quite sophisticated and at least partly take place beneath
the ‘surface’ of the game, BioShock also engages in an elaborate ‘political’
discussion about more abstract  and general  matters  such as choice,  free
will, and agency in the game’s overall narrative and gameplay, which I will
turn to now.
BioShock and the Politics of Choice
The most significant complication of how BioShock deals with objectivism
and its underlying principles occurs in a scene that happens roughly two
thirds into the game, in what is commonly referred to as the major ‘twist’ in
the game’s plot. In this scene, after having tried to reach Ryan for most of
the game, players finally locate him in his office. Through a window, they
10 However, as Packer notes, the gameplay of BioShock can also be analyzed as en-
gaging with objectivism, and it is an aspect often overlooked (in favor of the narra-
tive elements) in discussions of the game. For instance, he reads the abundance of
weapons that are part of the gameplay as “a critique of Objectivism by illustrating
that if governments abandoned control over defense and access to guns, those with
the most weapons would dominate” (216).  Cf. Packer 215-21 and van den Berg,
par. 19-22 for a more detailed ‘political’ reading of BioShock’s gameplay.
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look at Ryan calmly playing golf as he explains to Jack the truth about
Jack’s  identity,  which  Ryan  has  recently  found  out  for  himself.  Ryan
ponders whether Jack has come to kill him on his own accord or whether
he is just following orders, summarized in his question: “What separates a
man from a slave? Money? Power? No. A man chooses, a slave obeys.” Ac-
cordingly, he asks Jack whether “a man [was] sent to kill or a slave,” thus
questioning Jack’s motives and memories, asking if he has really chosen to
do what he is about to do. Through Ryan’s allusions, Jack, along with the
player, slowly begins to realize the truth: Jack was implanted with false
memories and has been deceived by Atlas to do as he commands, having
been genetically engineered to follow any order that is accompanied by the
phrase ‘would you kindly.’ This phrase has been used casually by Atlas
throughout the game  to give instructions to Jack, usually without players
noticing—and the last  time he used it  was indeed when he said:  “Now
would you kindly head to Ryan’s office and kill the son of a bitch?”11 This
twist  reveals  that  it  was  no  coincidence  that  Jack  crash-landed  over
Rapture; instead, he was genetically modified by Frank Fontaine, Ryan’s
long-time rival, for the sole purpose of assassinating Ryan. Directly after
this scene, Atlas reveals himself to be Fontaine, having faked his death and
having assumed the alias of Atlas to be able to overthrow Ryan with this
elaborate plot. Through this scene and other sources, including some of the
audio  diaries  found  afterwards,  players  will  eventually  piece  together
further parts of this revelation, among them the fact that Jack did indeed, as
Ryan suggests, hijack the airplane and force it to crash; that Jack was born
only four years ago and was genetically altered so that he would age much
more quickly; and that he is actually Ryan’s illegitimate son from an affair,
having been bought off by Fontaine from Jack’s mother when he was still
an embryo to train him as an assassin.
The way that these plot revelations are presented to players in this scene
constitutes  a  major  moment of  narrative instability  in  the game’s story-
world. That is, so far, even though the game did offer some options in terms
of how much of the ‘background’ story of Rapture players experience and
thus fill  the storyworld with,  the identities  of  the main characters  Jack,
Ryan, and Atlas all were stable constants in that storyworld, as were the
reasons for which Jack ventured through Rapture. This moment of revela-
tion significantly changes all of these certainties abruptly, prompts players
to reevaluate and revise major narrative elements, and thus destabilizes the
overall  conception of  the game’s storyworld in so far  that,  for  a  while,
players cannot be exactly certain what has happened in the game’s plot so
far—or who the character they are playing as really is. Significantly, this
11 That the trigger for Jack is the phrase ‘would you kindly’ is also meaningful in the
larger context of the game: It is, after all, not an order or a command but instead a
politely worded request, phrased as a question that actually suggests a choice (one
could technically answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’) when, in reality, Jack has none.
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twist moment is stylized in a fashion similar to such moments in texts that
also  feature  narrative  instability:  As  Ryan  questions  whether  Jack’s
memories of his childhood are real or whether the airplane really crashed,
players see flashbacks of these events on the screen. Likewise, when Ryan
reveals  the  power  of  the  phrase  ‘would  you kindly,’ they  hear  and see
Atlas’s repeated utterances of these words throughout the game once again,
in quick succession to indicate that Jack is currently thinking back to those
moments, slowly realizing, along with the player, that Ryan seems to be
telling the truth. This is a common trope in narratively unstable texts, and
these flashbacks during such a moment of instability equally occur in films
like The Sixth Sense (1999) or Fight Club (1999).12 Similar to those films,
the  game  diegetically  achieves  such  a  moment  of  instability  in  the
storyworld  through  a  constant  internal  focalization  of  Jack—whatever
players  witnessed  and  seemed  to  know  of  Rapture,  they  saw  and
experienced through his perspective, and accordingly, they were as clueless
about  his  real  identity  as  Jack  himself  until  the  moment  of  revelation.
Rowan  Tulloch  thus  summarizes  the  twist  as  “reveal[ing]  two  parallel
manipulations: Atlas’ manipulation of Jack, and the game’s manipulation of
the  player”  (33).  This  internal  focalization  is  also  why  players  see  the
flashback images on the screen in this scene, signifying an insight into how
Jack visualizes his memories in his mind at that moment. In this sense, the
close identification of the point of view with this character constitutes an
unreliable perspective.13
This revelation that Jack’s actions—which he thought were expressions
of his free will—were conditioned by Atlas’s verbal manipulation has sig-
nificant implications for the game’s engagement with objectivist ideas and
related  concerns,  as  do Ryan’s  final  speech and his  subsequent  actions.
After his lecture, Ryan uses the phrase ‘would you kindly’ to force Jack to
kill him with a golf club, and in his dying moments, Ryan repeatedly ex-
claims his crude motto that “[a] man chooses, a slave obeys.” Significantly,
12 In the twist  scene in  The Sixth Sense,  viewers  learn  that  the film’s  protagonist
(Malcolm Crowe played by Bruce Willis) has actually been dead all along, and the
flashbacks show previous moments of the protagonist interacting with other char-
acters without those characters noticing him. In Fight Club, the twist reveals that
the character Tyler Durden (Brad Pitt) is not an actual person but a manifestation of
the multiple personality disorder of the unnamed protagonist (Edward Norton), and
some of  the  flashback scenes  accordingly show the protagonist  in  situations  in
which, previously,  viewers saw Tyler. I understand both twist scenes in the two
films as constituting major moments of narrative instability. For a more detailed ex-
amination of such an instability, which I work on in the context of my doctoral re-
search project, cf. Schubert.
13 Significantly, though, after Ryan’s revelations, the game relatively quickly reestab-
lishes a stable storyworld in which all of these discoveries are privileged by the
game as the dominant interpretation of what happened in the game’s plot. This is
also similar to how films with singular moments of instability like The Sixth Sense
and Fight Club work. 
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his  belief  in  the  importance  of  free  will  and  choice  go  so  far  that  he
consciously chooses to die as long as he can expose and mock Jack’s lack
of agency in the matter, since for him, only a human being with choice is
really a “[hu]man.”14 In the context of the objectivist idealizing of choice
and free will, the scene is a pointed exaggeration of this ideology by por-
traying Ryan as believing that one’s death by choice is superior to a life
without choices.
Yet the game also develops these thoughts about the supposed impor-
tance of choice and agency on a metatextual level: Crucially, players have
no control whatsoever in the scene in which Jack kills Ryan. Normally, in
the  game,  players  navigate  Jack  through  the  various  environments  and
listen as characters sometimes interact with him; this is also how they listen
to Ryan through the window in his room while he is playing golf—players
can still move around the room they are standing in at that point. However,
once Ryan’s initial speech is finished and he starts demonstrating the power
of the phrase ‘would you kindly,’ a cutscene is shown: Players now simply
have to watch Jack follow Ryan’s orders, without being able to control the
character’s movements or actions at all. Cutscenes are commonly used in
video games to convey significant parts of the story, but they have often
been criticized as quintessentially noninteractive (cf. Klevjer), as “tempo-
rarily  steal[ing]  away  the  player’s  agency”  (Tavinor  103),  and they  are
rarely used in  BioShock. Switching to a cutscene in this moment to show
how the player character Jack brutally kills Ryan is thus a deliberate deci-
sion of the game to demonstrate that not only are players unable to choose
whether to kill Ryan, they do not even have control over the player charac-
ter while he is forced to perform these actions—Jack kills Ryan without
any input from the player. By generally closely aligning the player’s and
Jack’s  experience through the constant  internal  focalization of  Jack,  the
14 Ryan’s usage of the word ‘man’ to mean ‘human’ is of course telling in itself, since
it excludes women from the questions of choice and agency. It aligns with a general
lack of female voices in the game, as the positions of power in the struggle for
Rapture are mostly filled by men (like Ryan or Fontaine). However, interestingly,
while both of these ‘powerful’ men die at the end of the game, the most significant
female character, Brigid Tenenbaum, survives, and she is the one who narrates the
game’s epilogue(s), a point I will briefly come back to later. Generally, how gender
is represented in the game and in objectivist ideas is an interesting topic worth pur-
suing, but unfortunately outside of the scope of this article. For a brief investigation
of gender in BioShock, cf. Watts. Likewise, questions of ‘race’ and ethnicity in the
game seem equally productive to engage with further. Most prominently, Ryan’s
drastic use of the word ‘slave’ to signify a person who is without any potential for
choice or agency (and to thus implicitly claim that slaves are not human) is equally
problematic and highly simplistic, especially given the history of slavery in the US.
For an insight into how complex and ambivalent such constructions of agency are,
cf.  Bast,  who offers a specific  exploration of agency in the neo-slave narrative
Kindred that,  among other  aspects,  discusses  the complexities of  agency in the
context of the historical enslavement of African Americans in the US.
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scene also works to transmit Jack’s lack of agency to the player: In the
same  way  that  Jack  has  been  revealed  to  compulsively  follow  orders
accompanied by the words ‘would you kindly,’ the player in this scene is
exposed as having no real control over the player character—or the game’s
narrative,  for  that  matter.  The  scene  thus  makes  this  predicament
metatextually  obvious,  it  consciously  ‘mocks’ players  for  their  lack  of
control in this scene.15
Taking away player control in this significant scene when a large part of
the game so far had been about the player’s choices in exploring the world
is crucial for the game’s interest in discussing notions of choice and agency.
Jack cannot  stop himself  from killing Ryan because he uses  the  phrase
‘would you kindly,’ just as Atlas/Fontaine has throughout the game. This
revelation points back to how the whole game’s narrative has worked so
far: BioShock provides the player with certain choices in terms of exploring
the narrative and (actively) constructing the storyworld. Generally, almost
all video games strive to create what scholars in game studies often call the
‘illusion’ of choice and narrative agency (cf. Atkins 44; Domsch 42, 90)—
players are supposed to feel in control of playing the game and exploring
its world. However, I would argue that this ‘illusion’ is actually best under-
stood as a textual effect, as a perception, because players, of course, will
never be able to do everything in a game;  BioShock’s main story line is
linear  and  ‘fixed.’ Yet  through the  choices  in  narrative  exploration,  the
game does offer a heightened sense of this ‘illusion,’ the feeling or percep-
tion of being able to influence and choose between things, regardless of
one’s actual capacity to affect them. 
Throughout most of the game, players were effectively under this illu-
sion of choice, of navigating the game’s narrative (and world), while the
twist  suggests  that  Jack—and by extension the player—simply followed
Atlas’s orders and could not have done anything else. The scene thus meta-
textually points to the issue of choice and agency in video games in general
by basically proclaiming that there is none, only the illusion or perception
of it: “[T]he assumption, both of the player-character and of the player, of
15 This  ‘mockery’ is  also intensified  by making players  aware  of  their  naiveté  in
‘blindly’ following Atlas’s instructions throughout the game. As Rowan Tulloch
argues, Atlas’s function in the beginning of the game is similar to that of a tutorial,
which players  might  expect  to receive from their  experience of  playing similar
games, since Atlas “guides the player’s actions and choices” by telling the player
where to go and what to do, and thus, “like a tutorial or manual for most players he
is  unquestioningly  followed”  (29).  Not  only  are  players  thus  encouraged  to
‘believe’ Atlas as a character, but on a different, in a way extradiegetic, level, he
gains additional ‘trust’ because players assume his role is similar to that of a tuto-
rial, to a ‘neutral’ instance guiding players through the game. Of course, players ac-
tually had no choice in following Atlas’s instructions, but the scene in which Jack
confronts Ryan can only work as a twist if players were indeed willing to follow
Atlas ‘blindly.’ 
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the ability to exert agency and operate based on choice and free will [...]
has been an illusion from the start” (Watts 256; cf. also Tulloch 33). In this
scene, BioShock self-consciously plays with the fourth wall, making it very
difficult for players to suspend their disbelief. This constitutes a moment of
metatextual  instability  in  that  the  game  foregrounds  the  very  fact  that
players are currently playing a fictional game, over which, in the moment
of killing Ryan, they have no control or choice, in turn prompting them to
reevaluate how much choice they have had in the game so far at all.16 This
part of the game thus works to metatextually transfer the political question
of choice inherent in its objectivism-inspired world and its narrative to the
level of the player engaging in the game.
While  this  scene—and  the  game  overall—has  been  investigated  by
scholars as a critique of objectivism, when taking a step back and seeing
BioShock’s twist in the larger context of its overall narrative and gameplay,
I contend that the game is not just interested in a critique of objectivism but
more invested in a discussion of the underlying issues of choice, agency,
and free will. While the twist reveals that Jack (and players with him) had
no choice in reaching Ryan and killing him, it would be too simplistic to go
along with Ryan’s dichotomy and to thus assert that players in the game
have no choice,  that  as players of  BioShock,  “we are ultimately slaves”
(Aldred and Greenspan 490)—or even that “games make slaves of us all”
(Wysocki and Schandler 206). Instead, Ryan’s politics are not the game’s,
and  BioShock paints a more complicated and nuanced picture concerning
16 This twist scene has also been criticized by some scholars as a flaw of the game for
not giving players a choice in Jack’s actions, yet in my reading of BioShock, this is
exactly the point: Taking away player agency in this sequence is a conscious and
deliberate  decision  by  the  game  in  order  to  problematize  this  very  lack.  Clint
Hocking, for instance, also recognizes that in this scene, “[t]he game openly mocks
us for having willingly suspended our disbelief in order to enjoy it,” but he portrays
the fact that players “do not have the freedom to choose” as “a serious problem” in
the  context  of  the  game’s  narrative  and  ultimately  as  “insulting.” Similarly,
Matthew Wysocki and Matthew Schandler lament that “the gamer does not even
have control over the moment of confrontation” and state that “[w]hat is problem-
atic [...] is that when Ryan encourages us to ‘Choose or obey’ we cannot. When it
comes time to actually consider our options, agency and control have been taken
away from us” (204). However, they seemingly fail to see the meaning behind this
design, that this is deliberately so in the overall context of the game, that “there is a
point to be made by the player’s sudden lack of freedom: they are a pawn in the fic-
tional world of the game” (Tavinor 103), and that thus, in this scene, the game is
more interested in a metatextual argument about choice in video games than in ac-
tually giving players a choice. In addition, I would also argue that the scene ulti-
mately leads not to frustration among players but, in fact, to pleasure—pleasure
through a recognition of how the game has managed to so convincingly ‘trick’
players until the moment of the twist. In this sense, this pleasure derives from the
“operational aesthetic,” from “watch[ing] the gears at work, marveling at the craft
required  to  pull  off  such  narrative  pyrotechnics,”  as  Jason Mittell  notes  in  his
seminal article on narrative complexity (35).
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choice overall: How it deals with choice on the level of its narrative (and,
e.g.,  via  the character  of  Ryan)  is  different  from how the overall  game
metatextually depicts choice. As mentioned before, even if players in each
playthrough will always have to watch Jack kill Ryan, which areas of the
game before and after they explore in detail is their own choice. While cer-
tainly a less ‘important’ narrative element than the scene involving Ryan’s
death, these choices do lead to some narrative nonlinearity in that the story-
world will consist of different elements regarding Rapture and its inhabitants.
Additionally, there is an even more obvious and important choice in the
game concerning the fate of the so-called Little Sisters. The Little Sisters
are young girls who have been genetically altered and who roam around
Rapture to collect a substance called ADAM from corpses. ADAM is used
in the production of the powerful plasmids mentioned earlier,  which are
kinds  of  serums  that  can  be  consumed  to  gain  special  powers  through
genetic modification. While the Little Sisters are harmless themselves, they
are accompanied by large bodyguards (called ‘Big Daddies’), and after de-
feating these, players can choose whether to ‘harvest’ (i.e., kill) or to rescue
the Little Sisters. Killing them will grant the player immediate ADAM to
be spent on new plasmids, while rescuing them will initially lead to less
ADAM but more rewards at a later stage from the character Brigid Tenen-
baum, who created the Little Sisters. In addition, the choice of what to do
with the Little Sisters influences the ending of the game. In each of the
endings, Jack eventually defeats Frank Fontaine, and all of them feature a
voice-over by Tenenbaum. However, if Jack saved all of the Little Sisters,
the game shows a somewhat sentimental ending in which some of the Little
Sisters return with Jack to the surface and live happily together as a family.
If all of the Little Sisters were harvested, a much grimmer ending is shown,
in which a power-hungry Jack is depicted as consumed by ADAM and in
which another scene shows a nuclear submarine arriving close to where the
plane had crashed, only to be attacked by splicers coming out of a bathy-
sphere. If some of the Little Sisters are rescued and some are harvested, the
ending is identical to the second one, but the tone of Tenenbaum’s voice-
over is less one of anger and more one of disappointment.
The question whether to kill or rescue the Little Sisters is an interesting
moral choice in itself, and it again relates closely to the game’s preoccupa-
tion with objectivist ideas and choice in general. As Grant Tavinor notes,
“[t]he Little Sisters are the moral center of Bioshock. How the player deals
with them depends on [the player’s] moral notions of rights and fairness.
Treated as an economic transaction, an encounter with a Little Sister should
be seen a pure gain for the player” (104), and in a sense, one could thus see
the decision to harvest them as the ‘objectivist choice’ (Packer 218). On the
other hand, “[s]aving the Little Sisters does not have the optimal pay-off in
the  game-world—it  is,  properly  speaking,  an  act  of  altruism”  (Tavinor
105). Since the immediate gameplay rewards for killing the Little Sisters
are higher, Packer thus notes that “[t]he only incentive to save the Little
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Sisters is a moral one. [...] The decision to save or harvest the Little Sisters
inverts  traditional  video  game  strategy,  because  the  correct  choice
(assuming the moral choice is correct) is at odds with success in the game”
(219). Packer’s interpretation is insightful in pointing out that the choice
involving the Little Sisters “acts to highlight the game’s anti-Objectivist
message” (219), yet Packer’s reading of the game, similar to that of Miguel
Sicart (160), disregards the impact this choice has on the game’s ending:
Even though the gameplay reward might be higher for harvesting the Little
Sisters, saving them also offers players a narrative ‘reward’ in reaching a
‘happy ending.’ Accordingly, bringing the possibility of reaching different
endings through choices in the game together with the twist scene, what is
most  important  about  this  possibility  is  that  it  does  offer  players  some
choice (again, of course, within limits) and thus counteracts the implication
of the twist scene (and of Ryan) that Jack, and by extension the player, has
no choice at all in what happens to him. Especially after the twist scene,
players might be surprised in the end to learn that the choice regarding the
Little Sisters also leads to different narrative outcomes, that, in a way, there
is  a  narrative  ‘reward’  for  choosing  morally  or,  more  generally,  for
choosing  at  all,  and  that  “[w]hat  might  have  seemed  to  be  merely  a
gameplay  mechanic  [...]  turns  out  to  be  crucial  to  the  game’s  narrative
resolution” (Tavinor 105).17
Thus,  overall,  BioShock is  a complex engagement  with the nature of
choice(s) and agency in general and in video games in particular. While it
certainly includes criticism of an exaggerated emphasis on self-interest as
inherent in objectivism, it moves beyond Ayn Rand’s philosophy and sheds
light on the question of choice more generally—and particularly on a meta-
textual  level,  by foregrounding the notion of  how much agency players
17 The choice surrounding the Little Sisters is also interesting for other aspects that
cannot be discussed in detail here. For instance, Wysocki and Schandler point out
that the choice is flawed and “remains superficial” because when players need to
decide, BioShock “tells you that if you make the moral decision, the game, through
NPC Dr. Tenenbaum, will ‘make it worth your while.’ Whatever penalty of less
ADAM that  is  created by choosing to  do what  is  right  will  be offset  by some
benefit, even if it is delayed” (203). More generally, van den Berg notes that all of
the endings still submit to capitalist logic, since even in the ‘good’ ending, “the
player’s reward for choosing the common good over personal advancement is to
witness the reinstatement of traditional devices of the retainment of capital  and
means of production [...] if not linked to the individual, then at least within the con-
fines of the family unit” (par. 26). Jessica Aldred and Brian Greenspan likewise
criticize this supposedly ‘good’ ending as a “perverse femtopia that misrecognizes
itself  as a bourgeois nuclear family” (486). For the other ending, van den Berg
notes that “the game’s immediate invocation of nuclear Armageddon [...]  is the
perfect example of how it has become easier for us to imagine the end of the world
rather than the end of capitalist economy” (par. 29). For van den Berg, thus, while
BioShock  is “capable of offering a critique of  laissez-faire capitalism, it is never
quite able to imagine its disappearance all together” (par. 27).
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have in playing  BioShock (or games in general). The twist scene reveals
that players barely have any choices, no actual narrative agency in reaching
that point in the game, but the different endings of the game depending on
previous  choices  regarding  the  Little  Sisters  do  offer  some  agency  to
players, although again within the limits of achieving a textual effect of an
‘illusion’ of choice. Hence, the game itself rejects Ryan’s strict dichotomy
that  “[a]  man  chooses,  a  slave  obeys,”  that  one  either  has  choice  and
agency or that one has none, and paints the question of agency as a much
more complex and contradictory matter. It casts agency as an ambivalent
issue that constantly oscillates between an autonomous, conscious action
(or choice) and the influence other people can have on a person implement-
ing  this  action,  which  is  thus  always  realized  “within  a  dialectic  of
enablement and constraint” (Bast 152). On the level of the narrative, Jack’s
agency is complicated by the use of the phrase ‘would you kindly,’ but on a
metatextual level, of course, his agency completely hinges on the player,
who is actually in control of what Jack does—until that control, already re-
stricted  by  the  game’s  general  ‘illusion’  of  choice,  is  notably  and
deliberately  taken  away  in  the  twist  scene.  This  self-consciously
metatextual way of foregrounding the player’s lack of agency and control
transfers  the general  question of  the politics  of  choice from the game’s
narrative level  to  the level  of  those playing the game,  interweaving the
game’s politics with its  textuality. Overall,  then, that players have some
choices but are not in control of everything—that ‘absolute’ agency is, in
fact,  illusory—is  true  for  BioShock but  also  extends  to  video  games in
general—as  well  as  to  objectivism and  similar  political  ideologies  that
foreground the importance of individualism and individual agency. 
Conclusion
In this article, I have analyzed the video game BioShock for its political and
cultural work to demonstrate how it engages in a complex discussion of
choice and agency in video games and in political philosophies. BioShock
references  Ayn  Rand’s  philosophy  of  objectivism  to  depict  the  city  of
Rapture and its founder Andrew Ryan, and many of the game’s elements
can be understood as a criticism of objectivism and, generally, of an overre-
liance on individual choice and self-interest.  Yet  BioShock is not simply
interested in objectivism specifically but instead uses it to stage a larger,
metatextual  project  of  discussing  choice  and  narrative  agency  in  video
games in general. The twist scene, which constitutes a moment of narrative
instability,  is  especially  significant  in  self-consciously  highlighting  this
project, but the overall context of the game’s narrative, particularly the dif-
ferent endings it offers based on a moral choice, complicate a definitive
reading of that scene as well. Ultimately, BioShock lays bare how the issues
of choice and agency are  fraught  with ambivalence.  As a  commercially
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highly successful video game, it functions as a popular platform to engage
with these questions and ambivalences in the game itself, in objectivism
and other philosophies, and in video games in general, thus demonstrating
an interweaving of politicality and textuality in the medium of the video
game via a contemporary reflection on the politics of choice.
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